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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VENUS ANN SHERARD, 
Petitioner, 
v* 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent• 
Case No. 890383-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Ms. Sherard requests rehearing of this case. See Brown v. 
Pickard, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886)(explaining circumstances allowing 
rehearing); Cummincrs v. Nielson. 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913)(same). 
A copy of this Court's opinion is in Appendix 1. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT SHOULD MODIFY 
THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE ANALYSIS 
BY APPLYING THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
This Court's analysis of whether Ms. Sherard was entitled 
to a lesser included offense instruction is consistent with Utah 
law, with the exception of the standard of review applied. 
Following the State's argument on page 2 of Respondent's brief, this 
Court found that the lesser included offense instruction issue was 
to be reviewed for correctness. Sherard at 8, citing Carpet Barn v. 
Department of Transp., 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah App.), cert, denied 
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990)(citing Ramon v. Farr. 770 P.2d 131, 133 
(Utah 1989)). 
The Carpet Barn and Ramon cases relied on by this Court 
involve jury instructions in civil cases. 
Lesser included offense instructions in criminal cases are 
different from jury instructions in civil cases, because the lesser 
included offense instructions are essential to the criminal 
defendants' constitutional rights to due process, to be tried by a 
jury, and to the full benefit of the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard. E.g. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156-157 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988). 
Because the lesser included offense instructions are 
essential to these constitutional rights, a very high standard of 
review applies. This Court must view all of the evidence and 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
defendant. E.g. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 453 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 533 (Utah 1983); State v. Oldrovd, 685 
P.2d 551, 555 (Utah 1984). 
As the State conceded in its brief, the transcript of the 
police interview between Ms. Sherard and Officer Mendez supports the 
lesser included offense instruction in this case. See Respondents 
brief at 31-33, included in Appendix 2 to this petition. While 
other evidence presented in this case may appear to contradict the 
police interview, id., conflicting evidence requires the jury's 
assessment of credibility and resolution through lesser included 
offense instructions. E.g. State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 555 
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(Utah 1984); State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Velarde. 734 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986). 
This Court should rewrite the portion of the Sherard 
opinion indicating that the standard of appellate review is for 
correctness, and clarify that this Court will review lesser included 
offense instruction issues by viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the defendant, and by leaving the credibility of 
conflicting evidence to the jury. 
In the event that this Court agrees that the trial court 
violated Ms. Sherard's right to a lesser included offense 
instruction, this Court should then resolve whether the trial 
court's error was prejudicial.1 The question from the jurors 
concerning how to distinguish between second degree homicide and 
manslaughter, and the trial court's inadequate response to that 
question, preclude a finding of harmless error in this case. See 
Ms. Sherard's reply brief at 16-18. 
1. The Sherard opinion discusses the concept of harmless 
error in another case but appears to conclude that there was no 
error, rather than harmless error, in this case. The opinion states: 
Lastly, in Standiford. the Utah Supreme 
Court, on similar facts, held that "since the 
jury convicted of second degree murder despite 
the fact that an instruction was given on the 
lesser included offense of manslaughter, failure 
to give a negligent homicide instruction was, at 
very best, harmless error.11 Standiford. 769 P.2d 
at 267. Accordingly, we hold that the trial 
court did not err in refusing to instruct the 
jury on negligent homicide. 
Id. at 10. 
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II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD APPLY CRIMINAL STANDARDS 
IN COMPLETELY ASSESSING THE PRESERVATION OF 
THE VOIR DIRE ISSUE CONCERNING 
RUBY KELLY'S FAMILY MEMBERS. 
This Court disposed of the issue concerning the trial 
court's failure to voir dire the prospective jurors about their 
contacts with Ruby Kelly's family members with the conclusion that 
defense counsel failed to preserve the issue. Sherard at 6. 
This Court has yet to address whether the trial court 
should have asked the jurors concerning their contact with Ruby 
Kelly's family members, regardless of defense counsel's pursuit of 
the questions. The questions concerning Ruby Kelly's family members 
are based on statutory grounds for for-cause challenges. The trial 
court should have investigated this concern as part of a minimally 
sufficient voir dire in this court-conducted voir dire state. See 
State v. Woolley. 810 P.2d 440, 442-448 (Utah App.)(discussing trial 
court's duty to insure criminal defendants' right to an impartial 
jury), cert, denied (Utah Sept. 18, 1991); Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 18 (discussing jury selection and bases for for-cause 
challenges). The trial courts' responsibility in criminal 
voir dires is discussed more fully at page 23 of Ms. Sherard's 
opening brief and at pages 2 through 7 of Ms. Sherard's reply brief. 
This Court has yet to address the plain error question. 
The trial court was aware of the history of threats from Ruby 
Kelly's family members and was approached by one of the prospective 
jurors, who indicated that his contact with Ruby Kelly's family 
members precluded his service as a juror in this case. In these 
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circumstances, regardless of counsel's pursuit of the questions, and 
regardless of whether the trial courts have a duty to investigate 
the statutory grounds for for-cause challenges in every case, the 
trial court should have asked the potential jurors concerning their 
contacts with Ruby Kelly's family members. The plain error argument 
is discussed further at pages 20 through 23 of Ms. Sherard's opening 
brief and is also supported by pages 6 through 8 of the reply brief. 
This Court's conclusion that defense counsel failed to 
preserve the issue concerning Ruby Kelly's family members is based 
on Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 20,2 and on a civil case, Doe v. 
Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah App.), cert, granted 789 P.2d 33 
(Utah Nov. 29, 1989). Sherard at 6. 
2. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 20 states: 
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court 
are unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party 
state his objections to the actions of the court 
and the reasons therefor. If a party has no 
opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the 
absence of an objection shall not thereafter 
prejudice him. 
(Emphasis added). 
This Rule of Criminal Procedure does not require criminal 
defense attorneys to object to omissions of the trial courts, such 
as the failure to ask necessary voir dire questions. The parallel 
Rule of Civil Procedure 46 requires civil attorneys to bear the 
burden of objecting to omissions of the trial courts. The civil 
rule states: 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of 
the court are unnecessary. It is sufficient that 
a party, at the time the ruling or order of the 
court is made or sought, makes known to the court 
the action which he desires the court to take or 
his objection to the action of the court and his 
(continued) 
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As explained at pages 17 through 19 of Ms. Sherard's 
opening brief, voir dire in criminal cases is essential to the 
constitutional rights to a fair trial provided by article I sections 
7, 10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, and the fifth and sixth 
amendments to the United States Constitution.3 As explained at 
pages 2 through 4 of Ms. Sherard's reply brief, the constitutional 
rights at stake have been recognized in Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 18, which places the burden for adequate voir dire on the 
trial courts in criminal cases. 
Previous Utah criminal cases discussing the preservation of 
issues concerning the adequacy of voir dire have been decided under 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-35-12(d). Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 12(d) is identical to that statute and provides: 
Failure of the defendant to timely raise 
defenses or objections or to make requests which 
must be made prior to trial or at the time set by 
the court shall constitute waiver thereof, but 
the court for cause shown may grant relief from 
such waiver. 
Comparison of the facts of this case with the Utah criminal 
cases decided under the language of this rule demonstrates that the 
(footnote 2 continued) 
grounds therefor; and, if a party has no 
opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the 
time it is made, the absence of an objection does 
not thereafter prejudice him. 
(Emphasis added)• 
3. See e.g. State v. Jameson. 800 P.2d 798, 802-803 (Utah 
1990)(appellate courts are obliged to address the merits of 
constitutional issues if raised for first time in appellate court, 
if liberty interest is at stake). 
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issue concerning the trial court's failure to inquire about juror 
contacts with Ruby Kelly's family members is preserved for this 
Court's review. 
In State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988), the defendant 
tried to impeach the verdict with juror affidavits reflecting 
discussions during deliberations about juror bias against accused 
child abusers. Id. at 83. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's refusal to accept the juror affidavits, and indicated that 
defense counsel waived the issue concerning juror bias during 
voir dire of the jurors. The court stated: 
During voir dire, the jurors were not asked about 
experiences they may have had with child abuse or 
about biases they might have against one accused 
of harming a child. This is true despite the 
fact that DeMille's counsel was given an 
opportunity to question the jurors, an 
opportunity he declined. . . . We therefore hold 
that DeMille's failure to voir dire the jurors on 
this quite forseeable issue or object to the 
trial court's failure to cover the issue 
constitutes a waiver and bars inquiry into the 
bias question. 
Id. at 83. 
In State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 130 (Utah 1983)(per curiam), 
the appellants' brief indicates that voir dire questions were 
requested "in camera." Miller appellants' brief at 3. The State's 
brief in Miller indicates that "[t]here is no evidence in the record 
(a) that appellants' counsel requested that such questions be 
incorporated into voir dire or (b) that appellants' counsel objected 
to voir dire at any time prior to the presentation of evidence." 
Miller Respondent's Brief at 8. The Utah Supreme Court concluded 
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that the issue concerning the adequacy of the voir dire was waived, 
stating, "Counsel neither objected, reminded the judge of the 
oversight, made a new request, nor asked permission personally to 
voir dire the jury under U.C.A., 1953, §77-35-18(b)." Id. at 131. 
In this case, defense counsel submitted a motion for 
counsel-conducted voir dire, which was denied without prejudice. 
When defense counsel tried to participate in the voir dire, the 
trial court ordered counsel to address the voir dire question to the 
court (T. 53). Defense counsel submitted written proposed voir dire 
questions and written amended proposed voir dire questions, both of 
which specifically addressed juror acquaintance and/or contact with 
Ruby Kelly#s family members. Defense counsel requested questions at 
an unrecorded bench conference, reserved objections to all questions 
omitted by the trial court and requested by counsel, and explicitly 
attempted to mention each question omitted by the trial court. 
Opening brief of Ms. Sherard at 15-17. 
Under the preservation standards of criminal law, the issue 
concerning the inadequacy of the voir dire on juror contact with 
Ruby Kelly's family members is preserved. 
III. 
THIS COURT SHOULD CORRECT 
TWO FACTUAL ASSERTIONS IN SHERARD 
WHICH CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY 
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE. 
Ascertaining the actual facts of this case is extremely 
difficult because of the numerous inconsistent accounts provided by 
the witnesses. Opening brief of Ms. Sherard at 3. 
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However, to the best knowledge of counsel, there is no 
record support for this Court's factual statements which follow: 
When Sherard reached the front yard of 
Salazar's house, she met one of her friends whose 
face was bloody. The friend said that Kelly had 
hit her. In response, Sherard said that she 
wanted to fight Kelly, and subsequently a fight 
broke out between the two women. 
Sherard at 2. 
The State's assimilation of the evidence indicates that 
prior to Ms. Sherard's first fight with Ruby Kelly, Ms. Sherard had 
a fist fight with another young woman, either in the living room or 
outside the house. Respondent's brief at 8. 
Ms. Sherard's assimilation of the evidence indicates that 
prior to Ms. Sherard's first fight with Ruby Kelly, Ms. Sherard was 
jumped by two young women in the living room and then fought a young 
woman outside. Opening brief of Ms. Sherard at 5-13. 
In discussing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court 
indicated that several witnesses testified that Ms. Sherard 
approached the second fight with Ruby Kelly: 
As to the third element, although Sherard 
testified that she acted in self-defense, several 
witnesses testified that Sherard returned to 
Kelly, and without justification, resumed the 
fight. 
Sherard at 5. 
Of the six witnesses who were asked about how the second 
fight between Ms. Sherard and Ruby Kelly began, only one indicated 
that Ms. Sherard ran toward the second fight (T. 321). Two 
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witnesses indicated that Ruby Kelly ran toward Ms. Sherard for the 
second fight (T. 249; 299). One witness indicated that Ruby Kelly 
and one other person ran to fight Ms. Sherard for the second fight 
(T. 463, 492). One witness indicated that Ruby Kelly and the crowd 
ran to the second fight with Ms. Sherard (T. 195-196). One witness 
indicated that the second fight started after unidentified people 
ran toward Ms. Sherard (T. 525). 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Sherard requests rehearing of this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £6tL day of September, 1991. 
j ^ ^ 0-C cdQX 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Peti t ioner 
lABETH H6LBROQK v ELIZA1 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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APPENDIX 1 
Sherard Opinion 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
EPW1991 
/&&«<a^— 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Venus Ann Sherard, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
T.Noooan 
Cteric of the Court 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890383-CA 
F I L E D 
(September 10, 1991) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Attorneys: James C. Bradshaw, Joan C. Watt, and Elizabeth 
Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Russon. 
RUSSON,. Judge: 
Venus Ann Sherard appeals her conviction of criminal 
homicide, murder in the second degree, a first degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990). We affirm. 
FACTS 
We review the facts in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 554 (Utah App. 
1991). 
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on March 7, 1987, Sherard, 
with friends, went to a party at Vikki Salazar's home. The 
party had started around 7:00 p.m. When Sherard arrived, about 
thirty to forty people were present, most of whom were drinking. 
A short time after Sherard's arrival, Ruby Kelly, the 
victim in this case, arrived at the party with two friends, 
Kristi Bray and Tanya Benns. Sherard did not know Kelly, but 
did know Benns, who was a member of a rival gang. Benns began 
jarguing with Sherard and others, and in response, Salazar 
asked Keily and her friends to leave. Despite Salazar's 
protestations, Sherard offered to leave instead. 
When Sherard reached the front yard of Salazar's house, 
she met one of her friends whose face was bloody. The friend 
said that Kelly had hit her. In response, Sherard said that 
she wanted to fight Kelly, and subsequently a fight broke out 
between the two women. Kelly had the better of the fight, and 
eventually Sherard conceded. As Sherard walked away, Benns 
taunted her to continue the fight. According to one witness, 
Eloy Esquibel, before resuming the fight, Sherard asked him for 
a knife, which he gave her. Additionally, at least two 
witnesses heard someone shout that Sherard had a knife; another 
testified that he actually saw the knife in Sherard's hand. 
Sherard testified that Esquibel put "something- into her hand, 
which she did not look at, but believed was a knife. 
Sherard returned, and the fight resumed, moving into the 
street. According to several witnesses, Sherard delivered 
several uppercuts to Kelly's torso. Jeff Salazar, one witness 
to the fight, testified that he saw Sherard uppercut Kelly with 
the knife in her hand. Todd Kingston, another witness to the 
fight, testified that after the fight he took a knife from 
Sherard and threw it away; several other witnesses saw him do 
so. Additionally, Tommy Quintana, a friend of Sherard, 
testified that Sherard told him that she had stabbed Kelly. 
Kelly died from nine stab wounds. 
Sherard was subsequently tried by a jury and convicted of 
murder in the second degree. Sherard appeals that conviction, 
raising the following four points: (1) Was there sufficient 
evidence presented at trial to sustain her conviction for 
murder in the second degree? (2) Did the trial court abuse its 
discretion in limiting the voir dire- of the prospective 
jurors? (3) Did the trial court properly deny her request for 
a jury instruction on negligent homicide? (4) Did the trial 
court commit reversible error in its instructions to the jury 
on self-defense and mutual combat? 
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Sherard argues that the evidence presented at trial was 
insufficient to sustain a conviction for murder in the second 
degree. On appeal, we review the evidence and reasonable 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. State v, Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989) 
(citing State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). We do 
not weigh conflicting evidence, nor do we substitute our own 
judgment on the credibility of the witnesses for that of the 
jury. State v. Hopkins. 782 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah 1989); fi££ 
also State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah App. 1988). On 
appeal, we will reverse only if the evidence "is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt- that the defendant 
committed the crime of which she was convicted. State v. 
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted); 
£££ alSQ Petree, 659 P.2d at 444; State Vt JQB9S# 793 P.2d 902, 
903-04 (Utah App. 1990). 
1. Subsequent to the appeal in this case, another panel of 
this court clarified our marshaling requirement and applied it 
to criminal jury trials. State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 
(Utah App. 1990). Moore held that in order for an appellant's 
sufficiency of the evidence claim to be reviewed on the merits, 
the appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the 
jury's verdict and demonstrate that, even when viewed in the 
light most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict below. 
In the case at bar, Sherard has neither marshaled the 
evidence in support of the jury's verdict, nor shown that, in 
spite of this evidence, the verdict below is unsupportable. 
Appellant's brief contains no references whatsoever to the 
evidence presented at trial. In an apparent effort to respond 
to the marshaling requirement in Moore, appellant's reply brief 
contains a matrix that lists various witnesses and their 
testimony.on:.a number of issues. However-*;;.upoa examination, 
this matrix amounts to no more than an outline of transcript 
citations. The reply brief contains no indication as to what 
evidence supports the jury's verdict or what evidence opposes 
it, simply leaving it to us to decipher the chart. Nor does 
the reply brief contain any argument as to why the evidence is 
insufficient to support the jury's verdict in this case. In 
other words, Sherard has plainly failed to present a record for 
us to review for sufficiency. 
However, since Moore, by its own terms, is meant to apply 
only prospectively, JL£. at 739, and since this appeal was filed 
prior to the court's decision in Mcoxa, we review Sherard's 
sufficiency of the evidence claim on the merits. 
The jury was instructed on second degree murder as follows: 
Before you can convict the defendant, 
Venus Ann Sherard, of the crime of Criminal 
Homicide - Murder in the Second Degree, as 
charged in the Information on file in this 
case, you must find from all of the 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of 
the following elements of that offense. 
1. That on or about the 7th day of 
March, 1987, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the defendant, Venus Ann Sherard, 
caused the death of Ruby Kelly; and 
2. That said defendant then and 
there did so: (a) intentionally or 
knowingly; or (b) intending to cause 
serious bodily injury to another, she 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human 
life; or (c) knowingly acting under 
circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, she engaged in 
conduct which created a grave risk [of] 
death to another; 
3. That said defendant caused the 
death in an unlawful manner and without 
justification,. 
If you are convinced of the truth of 
each and every one of the foregoing 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
you must find the defendant guilty of the 
offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the 
Second Degree as charged in the Information. 
If, on the other hand, you find that 
the State has failed to prove any of these 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt then you 
must find the defendant not guilty. 
Viewing the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict, it is sufficiently 
conclusive to support the said verdict. As to the first 
element, all witnesses' accounts of the fight support the 
conclusion that Sherard caused the death of Kelly. As to the 
second element, Sherard's own testimony that Eloy Esquibel gave 
her something -heavy and . . . real cold and real hard like 
metal or something," which she believed was a knife, and that 
she punched Kelly with it numerous times, evidences, at the 
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very least, a depraved indifference to human life. This 
conclusion is further supported by the testimony of numerous 
witnesses who recounted Sherard's desire to fight Kelly, Eloy 
Esquibel's testimony that Sherard asked him for a knife before 
resuming the fight, and various witnesses' accounts of the 
second fight, including Jeff Salazar's testimony that he 
actually saw Sherard uppercut Kelly with a knife in her hand. 
As to the third element, although Sherard testified that she 
acted in self-defense, several witnesses testified that Sherard 
returned to Kelly and, without justification, resumed the 
fight. Given the amount of evidence which supports the State's 
case, we cannot say that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that Sherard was guilty of second degree 
murder, and therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient 
to support the jury's verdict. 
II. VOIR DIRE 
Sherard next claims that the trial court erred in limiting 
the voir dire of the prospective jurors. Specifically, she 
objects to the extent of the trial court's inquiry as to: 
(1) the relationship or contact between prospective jurors and 
Ruby Kelly's family, (2) group affiliations, (3) experience 
with and attitude toward alcohol, (4) experience with and 
attitude toward violence, and (5) exposure to publicity. 
Voir dire exists to detect bias justifying a challenge for 
cause and to assist counsel in the intelligent use of 
peremptory challenges. Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 456, 457 (Utah 
App.), ££££. Granted 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. 
Worthen, 765 P.2d 839/ 844 (Utah 1983) and Hornsbv v. 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah 
*Aprp.)/•££!£. denied flttb nam. ffornsbyv,' LPS Church/- 773 P.2d 45 
(Utah 1988)). The extent of voir dire is within the discretion 
of the.trial judge, as long ascounsel is given adequate 
information with which to evaluate prospective jurors. Id. 
Moreover, "whether the judge has abused that discretion is 
determined, not by considering isolated questions, but 
•considering the totality of the questioning.•- Id. at 457-58 
(quoting fil-ate v. Bishoo, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988)). 
Sherard's first voir dire issue, concerning the 
relationship or contact between prospective jurors and Ruby 
Kelly's family, was not properly preserved for appeal. When 
asked to pass the jury for cause, defense counsel objected to 
the omission of several requested areas of- inquiry# including 
the other matters raised on appeal herein. However, defense 
counsel did not object to the lack of inquiry into the 
relationship or contact between prospective jurors and Ruby 
Kelly's family. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 20 provides 
that counsel -state his objections to the actions of the court 
and the reasons therefor.- See also Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d at 
458. Since defense counsel failed to do so as to this issue, 
it was not properly preserved for appeal. 
Sherard1s second claim of inadequate voir dire, group 
affiliations of the prospective jurors, also fails. The two 
requested questions in this area that were not asked by the 
trial court were: 
Do you belong to any clubs or 
organizations? Which ones? 
What kinds of hobbies and leisure time 
activities do you enjoy? 
On appeal, Sherard claims that this area of inquiry would have 
revealed whether potential jurors could relate to the lifestyle 
of gang members or find such lifestyle opprobrious. However, 
she fails to support this blanket claim with any argument or 
analysis as to how either of the requested questions is 
probative of prospective jurors' opinions on the lifestyle of 
gang members. Moreover, this was never given as a reason for 
requesting these questions below. Since the trial courts have 
been instructed not to allow "inordinately extensive or 
unfocused questioning," id. at 457, we find no abuse of 
discretion on behalf of the trial court in refusing to ask 
these questions either. 
On the issue of alcohol, the trial court asked the 
potential jurors: 
There may be evidence during the course 
of this case that there were alcoholic 
beverages being consumed by the 
defendant, the victim and maybe others in 
their surroundings. Do any of you 
believe that it is simply morally wrong 
to consume alcoholic beverages in all 
cases and under all circumstances, if so, 
would you raise your hand? 
There were no affirmative responses to this question. Sherard 
claims that this question, was insufficient because it failed to 
address potential jurors* attitudes toward and experiences with 
alcohol. As to the former, we are of the opinion that this is 
precisely the sort of question which is designed to elicit 
potential jurors* attitudes toward alcohol. As to the latter, 
it is the trial court's duty to -protect juror privacy." State 
v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984). To that end, it is 
the trial court's duty to forbid defense counsel to "conduct an 
inquisition into the private beliefs and experiences of a 
venireman." Id. On the facts of this case, it was sufficient 
for the trial court to inquire on the attitudes of the 
potential jurors as to alcohol, without specifically inquiring 
as to their experiences with it. Accordingly, we find no abuse 
of discretion on this matter. 
Next, Sherard complains as to the inadequacy of 
investigation into the potential jurors' experiences with and 
attitudes toward violence. With respect to this issue, the 
trial court asked four questions: "[H]ave any of you been 
involved in a fist fight before?"; "Have any of you been in a 
fist fight or in a fight where weapons have been used?"; 
"[Have] any of you [] been witnesses to a serious injury as a 
result of a fight involving weapons . . . ?"; and "Do any of 
you believe that there is no circumstance or that it is morally 
wrong to be in a fight at all situations . . . ?" Taken as a 
whole, these questions were designed to and did elicit 
responses on the prospective jurors' experiences with and 
attitudes toward violence. Thus, the trial court's refusal to 
inquire further was not an abuse of discretion. 
The final issue with regard to voir dire is Sherard's 
claim that the jurors were not adequately questioned as to 
their exposure to publicity. The judge conducted the following 
inquiry: 
Have any of you heard anything about this 
case, if so, would you raise your hand? 
You can say yes or no to the question. 
Have you heard about this case? 
All right. Would your familiarity with 
the reporting cause you any reason to 
believe you could not be fair and 
impartial in this case? 
If you read something in the newspaper 
would you be caused to believe that this 
would be true simply because it's in the 
newspaper? 
If you heard testimony here in conflict 
with that which you read in the newspaper 
would you be willing to follow that which 
you believed from the courtroom that you 
heard in testimony rather than that which 
you read in the newspaper? 
Sherard's objection to exposure to pre-trial publicity concerns 
the court's failure to ask about specific magazines which the 
jurors read or to which they subscribed. However, defense 
counsel presented no argument to connect specific magazines 
with pre-trial publicity below, nor does counsel present such 
argument here. It is abundantly clear that the questions 
asked, in fact, revealed more about jurors' familiarity with 
pre-trial publicity than a vague question about specific 
magazines subscribed to and read could possibly have elicited. 
Therefore, again we find no abuse of discretion. 
In conclusion, the trial court's decision to limit voir 
dire did not prevent detection of bias, nor did it limit 
defense counsel's ability to intelligently use peremptory 
challenges. Accordinglyt we find no abuse of discretion in the 
limitation of voir dire by the trial court in this case. 
III. NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE 
Sherard next asserts that the trial court erred in failing 
to give her requested jury instruction on negligent homicide. 
We review a trial court's refusal to give a requested 
instruction under a correction of error standard, granting no 
particular deference to the trial court's ruling. Carpet Barn 
v. Department of Transo., 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah App.)/ cert. 
d£Hifi£ 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990) (citing Ramon v. Farr. 770 
P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989)). 
Although "a defendant's requested lesser included offense 
must be given when there is some evidence which supports the 
theory asserted by defendant/" State v. Sfcandiford. 769 P.2d 
254, 266 (Utah 1988) (citing State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152/ 
157-59 (Utah 1983)), there must also be a "'rational basis for 
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting Cher] of the included offense.*" State v. Laroccp, 
794 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah 1990) (quoting fiaJsfii, 671 P.2d at 
159). Thus, we must examine: (1) if there is sufficient 
evidence to support Sherard's request for a negligent homicide 
instruction, and (2) whether there is a rational basis for a 
verdict acquitting Sherard of murder in the second degree and 
manslaughter, on which the jury was also instructed, but still 
convicting her of negligent homicide. 
Negligent homicide and reckless manslaughter are related 
concepts, both requiring that defendant's conduct be "'a gross 
deviation' from the standard of care exercised by an ordinary 
person." Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267. The only difference is 
that manslaughter requires that the defendant was actually 
aware of the risk of death, while in negligent homicide, the 
defendant was not, but should have been aware of such risk. 
Id. (citing Boooess v. State. 655 P.2d 654, 656-58 (Utah 1982) 
(Stewart, J., concurring)). 
Our review of the evidence indicates that Sherard's 
request for a negligent homicide instruction is unsupportable. 
Sherard's own testimony was that Eloy Esquibel gave her 
something "heavy and . . . real cold and real hard like metal 
or something," which she believed was a knife, and that she 
punched Kelly with it several times. Additionally, after the 
fight, she told Tommy Quintana, "I stabbed her, I think I 
stabbed her." This testimony is inconsistent with negligent 
manslaughter's requirement that the defendant be unaware of the 
risks associated with her conduct. In fact, Sherard offers no 
evidence from which a jury could conclude that she was unaware 
of the risks involved. Without such evidence, we cannot 
justify an instruction on negligent homicide. 
Moreover, as noted in Section I above, the evidence 
presented at trial was sufficient to convict Sherard of the 
greater offense, second degree murder. We, therefore, find 
that there was no rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
Sherard of second degree murder and manslaughter and convicting 
her of negligent homicide. 
Lastly, in Standiford, the Utah Supreme Court, on similar 
facts, held that "since the jury convicted of second degree 
murder despite the f.act that an instruction was given on the 
lesser included offense of manslaughter, failure to give a 
negligent homicide instruction was, at very best, harmless 
error.- Standiford. 769 P.2d at 267. Accordingly, we hold 
that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the 
jury on negligent homicide. 
IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Sherard also contends that the trial court committed 
reversible error in instructing the jury on self-defense and 
mutual combat. Specifically, she argues that one of the 
instructions concerning self-defense erroneously stated that 
the test of the reasonableness of her actions was an objective, 
not subjective, test; and that the mutual combat instruction 
was irrelevant and confusing. 
"[Bjeyond the substantive scope, correctness, and clarity 
of the jury instructions, their precise wording and specificity 
is left to the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. 
AlZ/ 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted). 
However, the said instructions must not incorrectly or 
misieadingly state material rules of law. I&. 
Sherard argues that Jury Instruction Number 26 erroneously 
stated that self-defense is governed by an objective, not 
subjective, standard. Instruction Number 26 reads: 
The reasonableness of a belief that 
a person is justified in using force that 
would.cause death or serious bodily injury 
against another shall be determined from 
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under 
tiie then existing circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) (Supp. 1991) provides that, 
in order to successfully assert a claim of self-defense, a 
defendant must "reasonably believe[] that such force is 
necessary to defend [herself] . . . against such other's 
imminent use of unlawful force." We have previously stated 
that reasonable in the context of section 76-2-402(1) means 
10 
-objectively reasonable.- State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 985 
(Utah App. 1989) (quoting In re R.J.Z., 736 P.2d 235, 236 (Utah 
1987)). This instruction plainly complies with the objective 
standard requirement; therefore, the'trial court .did not err in 
giving the said instruction. 
Secondly, Sherard argues that the mutual combat 
instruction that was given was irrelevant and confusing. The 
instruction in question, Jury Instruction Number 18, provides: 
If you find that either party was a 
party to mutual combat, or other consensual 
altercation, and that during the course of 
the combat or altercation, either party 
used a deadly weapon, then you must not 
consider the consent of the victim in the 
encounter as a defense to the crime of 
Criminal Homicide. 
Almost every account of the fight between Sherard and 
Kelly indicates that it was, indeed, mutual combat. It was 
therefore entirely appropriate for the trial court to clarify 
by means of instruction that even if Kelly had mutually agreed 
to fight Sherard, this did not excuse Sherard's use of a deadly 
weapon in that fight. This is true, even if Kelly is viewed as 
the initial aggressor. Sfifi State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 90 
(Utah 1981) and cases cited therein. Since the precise wording 
of jury instructions is left to the sound discretion of the 
trial court, LQS&Z., 789 P.2d at 45, we hold that it was proper 
for the trial court to give the mutual combat instruction in 
question. 
CONCLUSION 
- In conclusion, we hold that: (l)-the evidence presented 
at trial was sufficient to sustain Sherard's conviction for 
murder in the second degree; (2) The trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in limiting the voir dire of the prospective 
jurors; (3) the trial court properly denied defendant's request 
for a jury instruction on negligent homicide; and (4) the trial 
court did not err in instructing the jury on self-defense and 
mutual combat. Accordingly, we affirm. 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Judith M. B i l l i n g s , Judge 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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APPENDIX 2 
State's Brief Concerning Evidence 
Supporting Lesser Included Offense Instruction 
was not sufficient evidence, in fact, no evidence, that would 
sustain that" (T. 626-627). Later the court stated, "The Court 
found there was no factual basis to sustain presenting [the 
negligent homicide instruction] to the jury and, thus, it would 
have been inappropriate to present that to the jury" (T. 631). 
Defendant objected to this refusal (T. 630). 
While negligent homicide is statutorily a lesser 
included offense of murder in the second degree, this does not 
mandate its inclusion in all homicide cases. State v. Crick, 
675 P.2d 527, 529-30 (Utah 1983); State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d at 
453; State v. Dyer# 671 P,2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983). Under the 
facts of defendant's case, a negligent homicide instruction could 
only be justified if defendant, in stabbing the victim, was 
"unaware but should have been aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk, or that [she] failed to perceive the nature 
and degree of the risk." Boqqess v. State, 655 P.2d 654, 655 
(Utah 1982) (citing the statutory definition of criminal 
negligence, Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-103(4)). Defendant does not 
dispute this legal issue or the lower court's determination of 
the appropriate law, but challenges the factual - application made 
by the court. 
Defendant's only factual support for the negligent 
homicide instruction is defendant's statement to the police at 
the time of her arrest. In the statement given on March 7, 1987, 
defendant stated that Todd Kingston gave her something in her 
The statutory texts for the pertinent offenses are contained in 
the introduction of this brief, at pages 2-3. 
-31-
left hand as she was fighting the victim, Ruby Kelly (R. 288). 
At the same time she heard him say "go with what you got- (R. 
286, 287, 288). The object she received -fit right in [her] 
hand, and [sic] it was heavy, and it was real cold and real hard 
like metal or something- (R. 288). Being right handed, she 
switched it to her right hand (R. 288). She did not state that 
she knew it was a knife but was not -completely positive that 
[she] didn't have anything- (R. 287). 
After the state introduced defendant's statement at 
trial, defendant took the stand and testified that her memory was 
better at the time of trial than when she gave the statement (T. 
549). She stated that she had been confused and scared when she 
talked to the police (T. 567). Defendant testified that in the 
two intervening years she had come to terms with the killing and 
the events were -a lot clearer- to her now (T. 549). In relation 
to her use of the knife, she remembered at trial that it was not 
Troy Kingston but Eloy Esquibel who gave her the knife (T. 523, 
567). She testified that while she did not look at the knife, 
common sense told her it was a knife -and she believed it was a 
knife (T. 523-524). She stated that she did not" think about not 
swinging with the knife because she was scared and just thinking 
of protecting herself (T. 525-26). Her defense at trial was not 
that she was unaware of the knife, but that either its use was 
justified based as self-defense, or that she had recklessly had 
it in her hand while fighting but without any intent to use it. 
Thus, the trial court properly instructed the jury on defendant's 
theories of the case when it instructed the jury on the lesser 
included offense of manslaughter and the justification of self-
defense. See State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1988). 
The only evidence which could possibly be construed as 
constituting criminal negligence, i.e., that defendant did not 
know she had a knife in her hand, was her original statement to 
the police. But, even defendant refuted the validity of that 
statement by claiming that her trial testimony was more accurate 
and detailed than her prior statement. While a court should not 
judge the credibility of the evidence offered in support of a 
requested lesser included offense, the court must still determine 
if a "sufficient quantum" of evidence has been offered. Where 
defendant admits that she was aware that she had a knife while 
fighting the victim hand-to-hand, there exists no factual basis 
to conclude that defendant's conduct merely constituted criminal 
negligence. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d at 453 (a defendant is 
not entitled to an instruction on negligent homicide where no 
rational view of the evidence supports it); Boqqess v. State, 655 
P.2d at 655 (an instruction on negligent homicide is not 
justified where a defendant, knowing the danger of a gun, points 
what- he mistakenly believes is an unloaded gun at a person and 
pulls the trigger). See also State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 
267 (Utah 1988) (a defendant's knowledge of the risk of death 
from the use of a weapon can be derived from the nature of the 
wounds themselves). 
Even if this Court were to find error in the lower 
court's refusal to instruct on negligent homicide, the error 
would be harmless. The jury was instructed on both the charged 
